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Introduction
Birth control has re-emerged as a political, legal and
constitutional conundrum–maybe obsession–echoing its first such
emergence fifty years ago, in the middle of the 1960s.
Underlying
the legal battles culminating in the Hobby Lobby1 decision from the
Supreme Court’s 2014 term, is a “culture war” that features familiar
antagonisms – antagonisms that some of us might have thought—
wrongly—had abated – that first rose to constitutional prominence in
Griswold v. Connecticut2 and Eisenstadt v. Baird,3 in 1965 and 1972
respectively. There is, though, a major difference between the
cultural, legal and constitutional wars around birth control of the
1960s and our contemporary birth control wars, which has gone
relatively unnoticed at least in the legal literature. By the end of that
decade, the two major sides to the birth control wars had converged
on a shared understanding of what I will refer to as the “social
meaning,” or point, of birth control; where they differed, of course,
was over its value.
But they more or less agreed on what birth
†

Frederick J. Hass Professor of Law and Philosophy, Georgetown
University Law Center.

1.

Burwell v. Hobby Lobby Stores, Inc., 134 S. Ct. 2751 (2014).

2.

Griswold v. Connecticut, 381 U.S. 479 (1965).

3.

Eisenstadt v. Baird, 405 U.S. 438 (1972).
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control is. For both groups, birth control was understood to be a
group of technologies that would artificially prevent or interrupt
conception, and which, by so doing, would allow women to control
their own fertility, and would allow heterosexual men and women to
enjoy a sexual liberty unconstrained by anxiety or fears of
conception.4 It would do other things as well. It would, for example,
enhance the health of some women, particularly those who had
already had multiple pregnancies, and for whom an additional
pregnancy might be dangerous or life threatening.5 And, it would
facilitate some degree of family planning by married couples seeking
to control the spacing and size of their families.6 But all participants
in those earlier birth control wars concurred that birth control, and
particularly the newly invented and highly effective pill, would
primarily allow women, whether married or not, much greater control
of fertility, and would permit all heterosexuals much greater sexual
liberty.
That social meaning, and certainly the consensus around it, has
virtually disappeared from our current legal debates about access to
birth control, and the existence or scope of claimed exemptions from
various duties to provide insurance that covers it. We hear virtually
no mention of it, either in the Hobby Lobby decision itself or in our
debates regarding it. The majority opinion in Hobby Lobby makes no
mention whatsoever of either the control of fertility or the liberation
of sexual expression as intrinsic to the point of birth control, and even
Justice Ginsburg’s dissent contains only one brief reference to the
control of fertility, and the importance of that control to women’s
equality,7 and no references at all to sexual expression, as part of birth
control’s value. The scholarly literature on Hobby Lobby both
preceding the decision and in its wake has followed suit. Again, save
the occasional article in the popular press, there is virtually no
discussion in the sizeable cottage industry of Hobby Lobby legal

4.

For a thorough legal history of the movement toward constitutionalizing
a right to use birth control, see generally DAVID J. GARROW, LIBERTY
AND SEXUALITY: THE RIGHT TO PRIVACY AND THE MAKING OF ROE V.
WADE (1998). For a social and political history of the movement for
access to birth control, see LINDA GORDON, THE MORAL PROPERTY OF
WOMEN: A HISTORY OF THE POLITICS OF BIRTH CONTROL IN AMERICA
vii-viii (2007).

5.

GARROW, supra note 4, at 94-95; GORDON, supra note 4, at 290-91.

6.

This was the use of birth control emphasized and explicitly protected in
Griswold. See Griswold, 381 U.S. at 503.

7.

Hobby Lobby Stores, Inc., 134 S. Ct. at 2751, 2787 (2014) (Ginsburg, J.,
dissenting).
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commentary,8 and rarely even an acknowledgement, of what birth
control is for the vast majority of users and objectors both: for many
women, a means of limiting fertility, whether or not a pregnancy
would be health or life threatening, and for perhaps an even larger
number of men and women both, a way of facilitating sexual liberty,
free of both the anxiety and the risks of reproduction.
Nor do we hear much of the arguments for or against birth
control that presuppose that understanding of birth control’s point, in
the legal, cultural and political discussions that have surrounded
Hobby Lobby. We don’t hear much, for example, in this round of
battles over birth control, of the virtues or vices of our changing
demographics as family sizes shrink, or of the value of the entry of
women into the workplace, prompted in part by their control of their
own fertility, which is in turn facilitated by birth control, or of the
greater participation of large numbers of men in parenting their young
children that is tied to the same social developments. We don’t hear
much of the lack of censure or stigma attached to the status of either
childlessness or illegitimacy. We are not asked, in our current legal
and constitutional debates, to imagine the difficulties or unfairness of
lives consumed by a cycle of continual and unwanted pregnancies,
breastfeeding, and the raising of small children, occupying for many
the course of an entire adult life, from the onset of menstruation to
death, much less of lives severely shortened by that fate, rather than
the reproductive lives so many of us enjoy, courtesy of birth control:
lives punctuated by the arrival of much wanted children occupying a
central part of a life, but a life that is also occupied by work, leisure
and adult civic and cultural pursuits. We don’t hear Loretta Lynn’s
or Matt McGinn’s strong country voices: “The pill, the pill/ I’m
pining for the pill/ I’ll never have anymore/ because they’re going to
bless the pill”9 – they were wrong on that last part – widely credited
by health organizations with having done more to educate rural
women in the 1970s and 1980s on their reproductive options than any

8.

Much of the progressive commentary on Hobby Lobby has focused not
on the ACA per se, but on the weaknesses and vagueness in the
Religious Freedom Restoration Act, and the result oriented decision
making which the act prompts. See, e.g., Ira Lupu, Hobby Lobby and
the Dubious Enterprise of Religious Exemptions, 38 HARV. J.L. &
GENDER 35, 35 (2015).

9.

MATT MCGINN, The Pill, on HONESTY IS OUT OF THE FASHION
(Transatlantic XTRA 1968); PETE SEEGER, The Pill, on PETE SEEGER:
A LINK IN THE CHAIN (Columbia/Legacy 1996); LORETTA LYNN, The
Pill, on BACK TO THE COUNTRY (MCA Records 1972) (lyrics differ
slightly: “But all I’ve seen of this old world/ Is a bed and a doctor bill…
Yeah I’m makin’ up for all those years/ Since I’ve got the pill”).

69

Health Matrix·Volume 26·Issue 1·2016
Hobby Lobby, Birth Control, and Our Ongoing Cultural Wars:
Pleasure and Desire in the Crossfires

education or public health campaign before or since.10 We hear even
less—we don’t hear anything really—of the value of the sexual
expression that is facilitated by the liberation of heterosexual
intercourse from the risks and concerns of unwanted pregnancies. On
the other side of the ledger, we don’t hear much of the moral wrongs
that birth control either constitutes or facilitates, according to its
socially conservative critics. We are not being asked, in this round of
our debates, to try to imagine, or at least understand, what’s wrong
with a sexuality in which the body is used as an instrument for
pleasure untied to the particular moral end of conception, or of the
host of social harms, from the difficulties of unwed parenthood to the
spectacle of a sex-saturated popular culture thrust on the interested
and uninterested alike, that might emanate from that use. To sum
this up, we don’t hear much, if anything, of the notion that birth
control, again precisely because it facilitates the control of fertility
and promotes sexual liberty, is either a boon to mankind for its
contribution to women’s equality or health, free sexual expression, or
family planning, or a dire threat, because of its destruction of the
nexus of family, marriage, sexuality and conception, the belief to
which it gives rise of a false equivalence of sexuality with sport or
expression or play, or its facilitation of greater rather than lesser male
control, commodification and exploitation of female sexuality.
This paper seeks to reverse this trend, simply by entering the
breach. In the four sections that follow, I first briefly examine, and
then criticize, each of two of the major arguments—which are by no
means the only arguments—that I believe have largely motivated
opposition to birth control, on the one side, and support of its use on
the other, for at least the last half-century, and the conception of
heterosexual morality on which each of these two arguments depends.
In the first two sections, I will take up and then criticize what I will
call the “neo-natural lawyers’ argument” against the use of birth
control. In the third and fourth sections, I look at and criticize a
“sexual-libertarian” (hereafter, sometimes, “libertarian” for short)
argument for the use of birth control. In both sections, my critical
focus will be not only on the competing arguments against or for birth
control put forward by neo-natural laws and sexual libertarians
respectively, but also on the competing conceptions of heterosexual
morality that underlie each of the two sides’ arguments.
My conclusion is that behind the constitutional veil of privacy
protected by Griswold and Eisenstadt and celebrated by sexual
libertarians, and behind the legal exemption recognized by Hobby
10.

Spotlight Exhibit: Loretta Lynn, ROCK HALL BLOG, ROCK & ROLL HALL
FAME,
(Feb.
10,
2012,
2:30
PM),
http://rockhall.com/blog/post/7268_spotlight-exhibit-loretta-lynnwomen-who-rock/#sthash.14ZxePrf.dpuf.

OF
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Lobby and treasured by social conservatives and their neo- natural
lawyer advocates, lie claims about the morality of heterosexuality and
reproduction that deserve close examination and criticism. This paper
seeks to at least put these arguments back on the table, along with
the extremely problematic conceptions of heterosexual morality on
which they rest and the political and psychic harms they may
occasion.

I. The Natural Lawyers’ Brief Against Birth Control
Without contraception, hetero, penetrative, vaginal-penile sexual
intercourse relatively predictably leads to conceptions, many of which
eventually blossom into full pregnancies and then live births. The
contemporary neo-natural lawyers’ argument against the use of birth
control, first made in a papal encyclical in 1930, has centered on the
claim that both those sexual acts and the blossoming of life to which
they lead, and not the pleasure which may happily be their byproduct
or the love they may cement, is the very point of marriage itself, at
least when marriage is properly understood.11 Contrary to the Court’s
claim in Eisenstadt that a marriage is nothing more than a voluntary
association of two individuals,12 a marriage, according to both
11.

Casti Connubii, Encyclical of Pope Pius XI on Christian Marriage to
the Venerable Brethren, Patriarchs, Primates, Archbishops, Bishops,
and other Local Ordinaries Enjoying Peace and Communion with the
Apostolic See [hereinafter 1930 Encyclical], reconfirmed in Pope Pius
XII, Nature of Their Profession, Allocution to Midwives (1951)
[hereinafter 1951 Encyclical], and in Encyclical Letter Humanae Vitae of
the Supreme Pontiff Paul VI to his Venerable Brethren, Patriarchs,
Primates, Archbishops, Bishops, and other Local Ordinaries Enjoying
Peace and Communion with the Apostolic See , to the Clergy and
Faithful of the Whole Catholic World, and to All Men of Good Will, on
the Regulation of Birth (1968) [hereinafter 1968 Encyclical]. See
generally Gerald Kelly, S.J., Contraception and the Natural Law, in
PROCEEDINGS OF THE EIGHTEENTH ANNUAL CONVENTION OF THE
CATHOLIC THEOLOGICAL SOCIETY OF AMERICA CONTRACEPTION AND
NATURAL LAW 25 (1963). The author notes in this paper that a
considerable portion of that paper is taken from Contemporary Moral
Theology, II: Marriage Questions (Westminster, Newman Press 1963)
by John C. Ford, S.J., and Gerald Kelly, S.J.. For the modern
arguments see generally Robert P. George & Gerard V. Bradley,
Marriage and the Liberal Imagination, 84 GEO. L.J. 301, 301-320 (1995);
Christopher Tollefson, The New Natural Law Theory, 10 LYCEUM 1, 7-8
(2008); Germain Grisez et al., Every Marital Act Ought to Be Open to
New Life: Toward a Clearer Understanding, 52 THOMIST 365, 365
(1988).

12.

Eisenstadt v. Baird, 405 U.S. 438, 453 (1972) (“Yet the marital couple is
not an independent entity with a mind and heart of its own, but an
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contemporary neo-natural lawyers and the canonical authorities on
which they rely, is a union of a man and woman for whom and
between whom the spiritual and biological unity achieved through
“sex of the reproductive form”—by which is meant heterosexual, noncontracepted, vaginal-penile, penetrative intercourse—both constitutes
an act of spiritual friendship and an opening to the creation of life.
That form of sex—and only that form of sex—makes the husband and
wife one flesh: both biologically and spiritually whole.13 Sex that is of
this reproductive form—or what they sometimes call “conjugal sex”—
is not simply a part of a healthy marriage, it is its very moral point.
It is what marriage is for: marriage is that relationship within which
heterosexual penetrative sex has this absolute moral value. It is that
sex, then—not affection, not simple friendship, not mutual care and
regard, not joint commitment to the welfare of each other, and not
even the shared work of child-raising—which gives marriage its
meaning and value likewise.
Birth control not only constitutes a form of endorsement of all the
sex that is pursued for other ends, but it also both represents and
facilitates the marital participants’ willful splintering of marital sex
from its moral end or goal. It strips marital sex and therefore
marriage itself of its natural and moral purpose, which is the physical
unity of marital partners in a sexual act of spiritual friendship that is
open to conception and the eventual creation of new human life.
When used by marital partners, birth control is thus doubly wrongful.
Outside of marriage, of course, it carries additional societal harms and
wrongs as well.
What has gone relatively unnoticed about this argument, perhaps
by the natural lawyers themselves but certainly by the natural
lawyers’ legions of critics, is that the natural lawyers’ brief against
birth control, rests on not one, but two related but nevertheless
distinct claims about sexual morality.
The first claim might be
called the “censorial claim”: all sexual relations that are not of the
“reproductive form” (marital, hetero, non-contracepted, vaginal-penile
and penetrative), according to the natural lawyers, are immoral. The
second claim, which is far less often examined and almost never
criticized, is what I will call the natural lawyers’ “valorizing claim”:
all sex that is of the reproductive form—sex that is hetero, vaginalpenile, penetrative, within marriage and, most important here,
uncontracepted—is an unalloyed, natural, human, spiritual and
intrinsic good.
This second claim asserts, in effect, that the
association of two individuals each with a separate intellectual and
emotional makeup.”).
13.

George & Bradley, supra note 11, at 305. See generally Grisez et al.,
supra note 11, at 416.
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reproductive form is a sufficient condition for moral sex: all marital
sex that is of the reproductive form is a natural, human good. There
are no further conditions to its value. The use of birth control
therefore frustrates participation in what would otherwise be a
morally praiseworthy, highly valorized, and intrinsically good act: sex
within marriage of the reproductive form (hereinafter, for short, “sex
of the marital form”, or sometimes, where the usage would not be
ambiguous, “marital sex”).
The natural lawyers’ brief against birth control then consists of
two arguments, and they are quite separate: first, contracepted sex
even within marriage, just like, and for the same reasons as, same sexsex, fornication, adultery, prostitution, and sex within marriage that
is not of the reproductive form for some other reason (nonpenetrative, etc.), all of which they call alternately “recreational,”
“affective,” “instrumental,” or “pleasurable,” is wrong. This follows
from the censorial claim. But second, so long as it is marital, noncontracepted sex—sex that is open to the possibility of pregnancy—is
a fundamental, unassailable human good. The use of birth control
within marriage negates or frustrates participation in that human
good. The second is a claim not about what sex is immoral and
wrong, but rather, what sex is fundamentally and always—
unconditionally—good: procreative sexual intercourse of the
reproductive form within marriage.
The use of birth control by
married partners prevents what would otherwise be participation in
this natural human good.
The natural lawyer’s censorial claim – that only sex of the marital
form is moral, or that all sex that is not of this form is immoral – has,
perhaps needless to say, attracted a tidal wave of criticism by legal
scholars as well as sexual ethicists, in large part because of the major
implications it seems to entail that pertain to law (or, more
accurately, its entailed implications that have in the recent past
pertained to law, given a pre-Lawrence conception of the scope of the
police power), including, but by no means limited to, its censorial
stance toward birth control. 14 First, of course, it immediately follows
from the natural lawyers’ censorial claim that “same-sex marriage” is
oxymoronic and its provision by states and its new-found
constitutional protection by the Supreme Court15 ill-advised: civil
marriage is the legal institution the very point of which is to protect
the social institution of marriage, which in turn and by definition
14.

See, e.g., Stephen Macedo, Homosexuality and the Conservative Mind,
84 GEO. L.J. 261 (1995); Chai Feldblum, Gay Is Good: The Moral Case
for Marriage Equality and More, 17 YALE J.L. & FEMINISM 139 (2005).

15.

Obergefell v. Hodges, 135 S.Ct. 2584 (2015) (holding that the
constitution protects the right to enter into a same-sex marriage).
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exists so as to facilitate heterosexual, penetrative sex of the marital
form, meaning that sex—penile-vaginal, penetrative and procreative—
which in form leads to conception.16 This is the argument that has
been most criticized by courts, including now the Supreme Court, and
commentators.17 Second, and as now countless commentators have
argued, it follows from the natural lawyer’s censorial claim that nonmarital sex in any form and toward any end, including all same-sex
sex, contracepted or non-contracepted heterosexual sex between
unmarried persons, or sex between partners of either or any gender
that is motivated by a desire to cement feelings of long-lasting and
deep love, is illicit. 18 It thus denies the morality not only of gay sex
that is sought solely for pleasure, or money, or prestige, but also of
affective gay sex, meaning sex between same-sex partners who are
committed to each other and to a long term or life-long relationship,
whether or not they wish to civilly marry and whether or not they
wish to have and raise children.19 Third, it follows from the natural
lawyers’ censorial claim that not only should only married
heterosexual partners engage in sex, but married partners should
engage in only that form of sex.
Sex “of the right form” within
marriage is a sacred comingling of the marital participants in a form
of sexual intercourse that has a particular teleological purpose, to wit,
conception. All other sex, including sex inside of marriage that is
either contracepted or that is otherwise not of the right form
(meaning, non penile-vaginal or non-penetrative), interrupts the moral
link between marital sex and conception, thus stripping sex of any
moral or religious purpose. It reduces it to an instrumental use of the
body for nothing but base pleasure. This prong of the argument has
of course also been subjected to criticism, including by both birth
control advocates and sexual libertarians, from the nineteen twenties
through the 1970s.20 In short, to sum the criticism, the natural
16.

See George & Bradley, supra note 11, at 307.

17.

See Obergefell v. Hodges, 135 S.Ct. 2584 (2015); Bostic v. Schaefer, 760
F.3d 352, 367-68 (4th Cir. 2014); Baskin v. Bogan, 766 F.3d 648, 661
(7th Cir. 2014); Kitchen v. Herbert, 755 F.3d 1193, 1210 (10th Cir.
2014); Goodridge v. Dep’t of Pub. Health, 798 N.E.2d 941, 961 (Mass.
2003).

18.

Macedo, supra note 14, at 274-75.

19.

Finnis argues for the latter, viewing the criminalization of gay sex
unwise and unjust for traditionally liberal reasons.

20.

For early twentieth century arguments focused on feminist campaigns
against involuntary motherhood and the institutions of marriage and the
Church, see The Public Writings and Speeches of Margaret Sanger,
http://www.nyu.edu/projects/sanger/webedition/app/documents/show.
php?sangerDoc=128167.xml; Margaret Sanger, No Gods, No Masters, in
THE
WOMAN
REBEL
1,
8,
16
(March
1914),
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lawyers’ censorial condemnation of contracepted and non-vaginallypenetrative marital sex, as well as all extramarital and same-sex sex,
rests on a view of sexuality, pleasure and love that seems untrue to
the experience of vast numbers of married as well as unmarried
people. For many married and unmarried partners alike in long term
committed relationships, both same and opposite-sex, contracepted or
non-penetrative sex is both moral and of great value: its value and its
morality both lie in the pleasure it facilitates and the way in which it
cements the partners’ affection for each other. The same seems true,
furthermore, for many people, in same sex and opposite sex relations
of shorter duration, and again regardless of the type of sex in which
the partners are engaged.
Common to almost all of the contemporary criticisms of the
canonical and neo-natural lawyers’ conception of heterosexual
morality, however, has been the critics’ focus on the Church’s
censorial claim. That is, the natural lawyers’ secular critics have
focused almost entirely on all of the sex that the natural lawyers
morally condemn. What has gone almost entirely un-criticized, by
contrast, and indeed almost unnoted, is what I’ve called above the
natural lawyer’s “valorizing claim”: the claim that all marital sex of
the marital form–ncontracepted, vaginal-penile, penetrative sex in
marriage–is an intrinsic human and common good, or more briefly,
that the marital form (which again includes the requirement that the
sex be un-contracepted) is a sufficient condition for the goodness of
sex. This second and much less examined claim regarding the
absolute goodness of marital sex, rather than the badness of nonmarital, is at least as significant a part of the natural lawyers’ brief
against birth control, although it doesn’t figure so centrally in their
argument against homosexuality, which may be why it has gone
relatively un-criticized. It is a gross misunderstanding and a serious
diminution of the natural law view of human sexuality and of sexual
morality to limit it to its censorial claim condemning the sex they
view as immoral. Rather, the natural law view of sexuality, in its
totality, also rests on the radically pro-sex claim that all noncontracepted sex of the marital form (including such sex between
infertile couples, where the infertility is for natural reasons), and all
the pregnancies to which that sex often leads, are good. Indeed, the
http://historymatters.gmu.edu/d/5084/. For late twentieth century
arguments focused on sexual liberty, see DAVID A.J. RICHARDS,
RESISTING INJUSTICE AND THE ETHICS OF CARE IN THE AGE OF OBAMA:
“SUDDENLY… ALL THE TRUTH WAS COMING OUT” 4 (2013); CAROL
GILLIGAN & DAVID A.J. RICHARDS, THE DEEPENING DARKNESS:
PATRIARCHY, RESISTANCE, AND DEMOCRACY’S FUTURE 4 (2009); DAVID
A.J. RICHARDS, WOMEN, GAYS AND THE CONSTITUTION: THE GROUNDS
FOR FEMINISM AND GAY RIGHTS IN CULTURE AND LAW (1998).
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wrongness of birth control used within marriage (as contrasted to
outside marriage) is precisely that it interrupts that form of morally
praiseworthy sex by intentionally and artificially frustrating the
possibility of conception. The wrongness of birth control, in other
words, is not only that it facilitates immoral sex, but also that it
frustrates otherwise morally exemplary procreative sex, which is the
raison d’etre, and the very center of married life. It is this valorizing
pro-sex claim of the natural lawyers, as well as the argument against
birth control which it grounds, that has gone virtually unnoticed by
the natural lawyers’ contemporary critics.
As a consequence of the natural lawyers’ critics’ relative
inattention to it, not only the natural lawyer’s valorizing claim
itself—that uncontracepted marital sex is an intrinsic human good—
but also the harms, particularly for married women, that this claim
might engender have gone relatively unnoticed in the scholarly
literature, although not, one might surmise, in married life itself.
Critics have focused on and catalogued instead the harms caused by
the censorial claim: the denial of the equal value and worth of samesex affective sex, the unnecessary censure of sexual expression, the
dour and damning stance toward sexual pleasure both within and
outside marriage, the sizeable social costs of criminalizing or censuring
prostitution, fornication, or homosexuality, and of course the
condemnatory stance toward same-sex couples and same-sex
marriage.21 Critics have not looked at the harms that might be
caused by the natural lawyers’ valorizing pro-sex claim: that all
uncontracepted sex within marriage that is of the marital form is an
intrinsic human good. The legalistic black box created by the
Religious Freedom Restoration Act, Hobby Lobby, and the debate
surrounding that case, as described above, pushes those arguments
and the harms they might cause all the further from public awareness.
Those harms, though, are quite real, and they are utterly distinct and
quite different from the harms caused by the censorship of pleasurable
and affective sex. The next section tries at least to catalogue them.

II. Is Procreative Marital Sex an Intrinsic Good?
One Critique
What does the neo-natural lawyers’ blanket moral celebration of
all uncontracepted marital sex include? What falls within the
category of the sex the natural lawyers celebrate, and might some of
that laudatory celebration be misguided?
Does it include, for

21.

See generally George & Bradley, supra note 11, at 311; Macedo, supra
note 14, at 275.
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example, nonconsensual marital sex? It isn’t at all clear.22 In their
many elaborate definitions and descriptions of marital sex, and their
constant iteration of the various conditions that sex must meet, in
order for it to be moral and praiseworthy, “mutual consent” of the
parties is rarely unambiguously included. Thus, Thomas Aquinas
believed that married women have a positive duty to be sexually
available to their husbands, and that to deny their husbands sexual
access was sinful (and vice versa; men likewise have a duty to be
sexually available to their wives). A woman who withholds sex from
her husband, he believed, commits a greater sin than a man’s rape of
a stranger—the former is a sin against nature, while the latter is
simply a sin against a person.23 The Encyclical from 1930 that
explains the Church’s view of marriage, marital sex, and family life,
doesn’t noticeably soften this Thomistic stance. In the only reference
I could find regarding the topic of consent, Pope Pius explains that
periodic abstinence is an acceptable method of birth control, but only
if both partners consent to it. Thus, presumably, the desire of only
one party that the couple abstain from sex (in order to prevent
conception) is not a sufficient grounds for abstaining: if one party
wishes to abstain but the other party does not, the sex not only may
happen but apparently should.24 To translate this into modern terms,
a woman’s “no,” according to Pope Pius writing in the 1930s, is not
by itself a sufficient reason to abstain from marital intercourse if her
husband does not agree; the man has veto power. In the 1968
Encyclical on birth control, Pope Paul references apparently with
some approval his understanding that “[m]en rightly observe” that for
a man to impose sex on one’s partner against “her condition or
personal and reasonable wishes” is a wrong. 25 Still, this observation
about what “men rightly observe” is made only to suggest that
anyone who so thinks should also see the immorality of having sex
against the reasonable wishes of the Divine Creator–meaning, should
also see the immorality of contracepted sex. One wonders, though,
what might be the status of a sexual act imposed against a wife’s
unreasonable wishes. Nevertheless, at least by the 1960s, a married
22.

As a legal matter, consent was not a condition of legal marital sex until
the reforms of the 1980s began to result in the systematic removal, or at
least trimming back, of marital rape exemptions in states’ regulation of
rape. See generally Jill Elaine Hasday, Contest and Consent: A Legal
History of Marital Rape, 88 CAL. L. REV. 1373, 1392, 1484-85 (2000).

23.

I thank Mary Becker for the point. For a full discussion, see Mary
Becker, Family Law in the Secular State and Restrictions on Same-Sex
Marriage: Two are Better than One, 2001 U. Ill. L. Rev. 1, 26 (1999).

24.

1930 Encyclical at ¶ 53.

25.

1968 Encyclical at ¶ 13.
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woman’s no, within canonical catholic thinking on the topic,
apparently means no and must be abided, so long as the “no” rests on
reasonable grounds, or at least, according to the Pope, so some men
rightly think.
It is still, today, not entirely clear whether the “marital form”
that sex must take, in order for it to be morally exemplary, includes a
requirement that it be consensual. Thus, it is worth noting that in
the quite detailed contemporary scholarly discussions of the multiple
necessary conditions for moral sex penned by contemporary natural
lawyers—that it be between married partners, that it be noncontracepted, that it be penetrative and penile-vaginal rather than
oral or anal or digital, and so on—there is never a clear elucidation of
the idea that it must also be consensual. There is no mention, for
example, in Bradley and George’s lengthy article from the mid-1990s
in the Georgetown Law Journal detailing the nature of marital sex,
that consent is a necessary condition for moral heterosexual
relations.26 Of course, that may well be because Bradley, George, and
other contemporary neo-natural lawyers now regard the necessity of
consent as so apparent as to require no mention. But it’s an odd and
disconcerting omission nevertheless.
What, though, of unwanted marital sex? By that phrase, I do not
mean rape, but rather, that marital sex to which a woman or a man
unambiguously consents, but which she or he does not physically
desire, and does not emotionally welcome or want. Does “sex of the
marital form” that the natural lawyers laud include that sex? Is
unwanted sex included, within the natural lawyers’ blanket
valorization of marital sex? Given the insistent and now millennialong valorization within Catholic theological thought of sex of the
marital form itself—hetero, non-contracepted, vaginal-penile and
penetrative—it is not unreasonable to surmise that an awful lot of
that sex is indeed physically unpleasurable for women, simply because
the type of sex endorsed has virtually nothing to do with the physical
location of the sources of women’s sexual pleasure. For that reason
alone, it seems fair to speculate that much of the sex that the natural
lawyers laud is also not physically desired by some, and maybe many
wives. It might be fair to surmise, then, although there’s remarkably
little scholarship on the point,27 that women in traditional marriages
26.

George & Bradley, supra note 11.

27.

There is a growing body of social sciences scholarship on unwanted sex
engaged in by college students and young adults of both sexes, some of
it inspired by and informed by feminist concerns that the willingness of
young women to consent to sex they do not want is a function of gender
role stereotyping. See generally Alyson K. Spurgas, Embodied Invisible
Labor and Sexual Carework: Women’s Roles in Sexualized Social
Reproduction within Intimate Relationships, (unpublished manuscript)
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engage in at least some marital sex (sex of the marital form) that
they do not physically desire or find particularly pleasurable. If so,
they are engaging in an act—unwanted, undesired, and unwelcome
but nevertheless consensual sex—that is, according to a wave or
recent social science research, apparently relatively common among
heterosexual women, and, at least in some age groups among
heterosexual men as well, and one that is increasingly recognized as
carrying with it distinctive harms.28
Short of physical coercion, why might women, including married
women in traditional marriages, engage in unwanted sex? To
speculate: a married woman might engage in unwanted marital sex to
retain her husband’s affection, loyalty, fidelity, or support, to
maintain relative domestic peace in the household, as a quid pro quo
for her husband’s day to day financial support for herself and her
children, to avoid her husband’s foul mood, wrath, anger, or violence,
out of altruism, pity, or friendship, or simply because she feels it is
(on file with author); Emily A. Impett & Letitia A. Peplau, Why Some
Women Consent to Sex with a Dating Partner: Insights from
Attachment Theory, 26 PSYCHOL. OF WOMEN Q. 360, 366-67 (2002);
Shantee Foster, Consensual Unwanted Sex: Motivations and
Reservations (May 1, 2011) (unpublished Ph.D. dissertation, The
University of North Carolina at Greensboro); Sarah J. Walker, When
“No” Becomes “Yes”: Why Girls and Women Consent to Unwanted
Sex, 6 APPLIED & PREVENTIVE PSYCHOL. 157 (1997); Susan Sprecher et
al., Token Resistance to Sexual Intercourse and Consent to Unwanted
Sexual Intercourse: College Students’ Dating Experience in Three
Countries, 31 J. SEX RESEARCH 125, 125 (1994); Lucia F. O’Sullivan &
Elizabeth R. Allgeier, Feigning Sexual Desire: Consenting to Unwanted
Sexual Activity in Heterosexual Dating Relationships, 35 J. SEX
RESEARCH 234, 241 (1998); Charlene L. Muehlenhard & Stephen W.
Cook, Men’s Self-Reports of Unwanted Sexual Activity, 24 J. SEX
RESEARCH 58 (1988); Miriam Lewin, Unwanted Intercourse: The
Difficulty of Saying No, 9 PSYCHOLOGY OF WOMEN Q. 184, 184-192
(1995); Pamela I. Erickson & Andrea J. Rapkin, Unwanted Sexual
Experiences Among Middle and High School Youth, 12 J. ADOLESCENT
HEALTH 319 (1991); Amy Buddie et al., Consenting to Unwanted Sex:
Effects of Gender and Relationship Type, Address Presented at the
Annual Meeting of the Southeastern Psychological Association (2011);
There is only one article that I have found on the propensity of married
women to consent to sex they don’t want, and that involves young
married brides in India. K.G. Santhya et al., Consent and Coercion:
Examining Unwanted Sex Among Married Young Women in India, 32
INT’L FAM. PLANNING PERSP. 124, 124 (2007).
28.

Robin West, Sex, Law, and Consent, in THE ETHICS OF CONSENT:
THEORY AND PRACTICE 221, 243 (Franklin Miller & Alan Wertheimer,
eds., 2010) [hereinafter West, Sex, Law, and Consent]; see also Robin
West, The Harms of Consensual Sex, in THE PHILOSOPHY OF SEX:
CONTEMPORARY READINGS 317, 319 (Alan Soble & Nicholas Power, eds.,
5th ed. 2008).
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expected of her by their social or religious community. Natural
lawyers might find these “instrumental” uses of the sexual body to
achieve other ends worrisome, and I think they would be right to do
so. In an arguably prescient passage, Pope Pius argued that the use of
birth control within marriage might encourage in men a tendency to
view their wives and their wives’ bodies as a vehicle for the
satisfaction of their own physical desires, rather than with the
reverence that God and the Church demand and which their wives
deserve.29 This is at least an indirect but notably feminist
condemnation of not only a husband’s exploitation of his wife’s body,
but also and more generally a critique of unwanted marital sex,
although couched within an argument against birth control and sex
engaged in for pleasure, not in an argument focused on harms to the
woman whose body may come to be so regarded.
The natural lawyers’ reason for finding instrumental, unwanted,
marital sex to be worrisome, however, is clearly its instrumentality
and not its “unwanted-ness.”
That is, neo-natural lawyers might
well object to unwanted marital sex engaged in for the purpose of
securing domestic peace, or for financial support, or to meet
community expectations, or to satiate a husband’s physical sexual
needs. However, they would object to all that unwanted marital sex
(assuming they would) for precisely the same reason that they object
to contracepted sex-for-pleasure or sex-for-money or sex-for-love: the
instrumental use of the sexual body for ends other than what gives
sex its moral meaning, which is the conjugal union of a man and a
woman in a sexual act of the reproductive form. There is, in other
words, in the natural lawyers’ account, a blanket condemnation of
“instrumental” sex, and presumably that would include unwanted
instrumental sex as well.
What there isn’t, though, in either
academic natural law writing, nor in any of the Encyclicals (that I
can find), is a blanket condemnation, or really any criticism at all, of
unwanted sex “of the marital form” whether instrumental or not.
And of course there is no discussion or recognition of the harms that
unwanted sex might cause.30

29.

See 1930 Encyclical; 1951 Encyclical; 1968 Encyclical.

30.

In fact, in a striking passage, Bradley and George argue very much to
the contrary – that unpleasurable sex that is not instrumental, is not,
therefore, wrong, and might even be morally required. Even infertile
married couples who can’t procreate and don’t get any pleasure from sex
nevertheless have a “reason” – meaning, a moral reason, rather than an
instrumental reason, and thus, presumably, a duty – to engage in
marital sex, regardless of both their infertility and their mutual lack of
desire. While they don’t say so explicitly, what this seems to suggest is
that a wife has a moral duty to engage in sex which her husband may
very much desire but which she does not desire, and which he might
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Does all of this unwanted sex cause harm? I have argued
elsewhere, as have a handful of feminist legal theorists and more
recently a number of social scientists as well, that unwanted sex–sex
to which women consent but which they do not desire–carries with it
a host of possible psychic and emotional and political harms. I will
elaborate on those harms in the next section. My point here is
narrower: the natural lawyers’ valorization of marital sex, on which
their condemnation of birth control rests, seemingly endorses as
morally salutary and perhaps even morally obligatory precisely this
unwanted sex, so long as it is of the marital form. Again, that
unwanted sex might be injurious and if so, then it might well be all
the more injurious when inside long term relationships such as
traditional marriage than outside it. Here, I just want to make clear
that the natural lawyer’s conception of heterosexual morality is not
just inattentive to those possible harms. It seemingly celebrates the
sex that causes them.
There is, though, a third and much less contestable harm that is
quite clearly occasioned by “sex of the marital form,” and that is,
oddly, almost entirely untouched by the neo-natural lawyers’
contemporary critics. The natural lawyer’s valorization of procreative
marital sex includes all marital sex, not only whether or not it’s
wanted and perhaps whether or not it’s consensual, but also whether
or not it leads to unwanted pregnancies. Marital sex, recall, at least
for the modern popes, might be permissibly regulated through natural
forms of birth control—meaning rhythm methods—but it must also
always be open to at least the possibility of conception. And, some of
those pregnancies—some sizeable subset of all the pregnancies that
result from the marital sex that is valorized by natural lawyers—
might not be in the woman or her husband or her other children’s
best interests, all things considered. Some of those pregnancies,
whether or not wanted, might be a burden to the woman’s health or
wellbeing, or to her education, her employment, or her employment
prospects, or to the couple’s pocketbook. Those pregnancies might be
objectively harmful, or at least costly, for any of those reasons. In
addition, though, many of the pregnancies caused by marital sex are
clearly not wanted or desired by the women who will bear them, as
evidenced in part by the abortion rate for women in traditional as
well as non-traditional marriages or relationships.31 Yet, according to
enjoy but from which she receives no pleasure. See generally George &
Bradley, supra note 11, at 305-306.
31.

See Fact Sheet: Unintended Pregnancies in the United States,
GUTTMACHER INST.
(July
2015)
[hereinafter
GUTTMACHER],
http://www.guttmacher.org/pubs/FB-Unintended-Pregnancy-US.html
(“Some groups—including higher-income women, white women, college
graduates and married women—are comparatively successful in timing
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the neo-natural lawyers, all marital sex—not only those sexual acts
which lead to wanted pregnancies, but also those which lead to
unwanted pregnancies—constitute an unassailable, natural, human
good.
In contrast to the popes’ and the neo-natural lawyers’ possibly
shifting position on the morality of nonconsensual or unwanted
marital sex, their position on this point is absolutely unambiguous
and distressingly unchanging. The 1930, 1951, and 1968 Encyclicals
are all quite clear on this point, as are the neo-natural lawyers’ more
contemporary elucidation of the position from the 1990s and 2000s.32
A pregnancy that is unwanted nevertheless ushers in a new life that
must be welcomed, nurtured and celebrated. A desire to not become
pregnant, even if both parties share it and even if it is entirely
“reasonable,” and even if it is therefore sufficient to justify abstention,
is not a sufficient warrant for the use of artificial birth control that
will actually prove effective. To put this all together, a married
woman, according to both popes who have spoken in detail on the
subject, has a moral obligation to have procreative marital sex she
does not desire and from which she receives no pleasure, and then a
further obligation to bear a pregnancy she does not desire, and which
may threaten her life, her health, her pocketbook, or her family’s
overall wellbeing. Because they do not address it, it is not at all
clear whether contemporary natural law scholars, including Finnis,
Bradley, and George, would disagree.
What harms attend all of those unwanted pregnancies? All
pregnancies, certainly including intensely wanted ones, carry risks and
costs to both a woman’s health and to her mobility and
Unwanted pregnancies, however, carry far more.
employment.33
Some of these risks and costs are well known. First, a lack of desire
to be pregnant is surely oftentimes a sensible proxy for greater harms
down the road: If a woman did not want the pregnancy because of
health risks, those risks are obviously more likely to come to pass;
unwanted pregnancies will tend to correlate with those pregnancies
that are more health endangering and life threatening than intended

and spacing their pregnancies. For example, higher –income white
women experience unintended pregnancy at less than half the national
rate (20 vs. 54 per 1,000).”). See generally Lawrence B. Finer & Mia R.
Zolna, Shifts in Intended and Unintended Pregnancies in the United
States, 2001–2008, 104 AM. J. PUB. HEALTH 43, 45 (Supp. 2014).
32.

See 1930 Encyclical; 1951 Encyclical; 1968 Encyclical; George &
Bradley, supra note 11, at 305; Grisez, supra note 11, at 365.

33.

See generally EILEEN MCDONAGH, BREAKING THE ABORTION DEADLOCK:
FROM CHOICE TO CONSENT (1996); Shari Motro, Preglimony, 63 STAN.
L. REV. 647 (2011).
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and wanted pregnancies.34
Likewise, if she did not want the
pregnancy because of worries about employment, then it is more likely
than if the pregnancy were wanted, it may well cause an interruption
in her work.35 If she did not want the pregnancy because she has too
many children to care for already, then, again, it is likely that she was
right to so worry: her mothering and her existing children may suffer.
So will her engagement in educational, social, civic and cultural life.
A lack of desire to be pregnant, in other words, is clearly a proxy for
the familiar objective harms of pregnancy. And of course, a married
woman’s lack of desire for a pregnancy means that it may lead either
to an abortion, in spite of whatever strong moral objections she may
harbor to the procedure, or to an unwanted birth. Either outcome is
harmful in well documented ways.36 A woman’s lack of desire for a
pregnancy, in other words, is a pretty good indicator that the
pregnancy may be against her or her family’s interest.
But an unwanted pregnancy might also carry less sizeable but less
noted risks of psychic, emotional and political harms – harms which
are independent of or in addition to the increased risks of whatever
factors might have rendered the pregnancy unwanted. Of course, an
undesired pregnancy is obviously less joyful than a wanted pregnancy,
and without that joy, the discomfort and sickness attendant to even
much wanted pregnancies are significant psychic as well as physical
harms. But there are other harms as well, less noticed, but equally
important, that attach to an unwanted pregnancy, even if that
pregnancy is medically unexceptional, and whether or not it leads to a
live birth, miscarriage or abortion. I believe there are four harms
34.

See GUTTMACHER, supra note 31 (noting that “[b]irths resulting from
unintended or closely spaced pregnancies are associated with adverse
maternal and child health outcomes, such as delayed prenatal care,
premature birth and negative physical and mental health effects for
children.”)

35.

Id. (“The costs associated with unintended pregnancy would be even
higher if not for continued federal and state investments in family
planning services. In 2010, the nationwide public investment in family
planning services resulted in $13.6 billion in net savings from helping
women avoid unintended pregnancies and a range of other negative
reproductive health outcomes, such as HIV and other STIs, cervical
cancer and infertility. In the absence of the current U.S. publicly funded
family planning effort, the public costs of unintended pregnancies in
2010 might have been 75% higher. Total public expenditures on
unintended pregnancies nationwide were estimated to be $21.0 billion in
2010. Of that, $14.6 billion were federal expenditures and $6.4 billion
were state expenditures.”)

36.

See id. There are no uncontested long lasting harms of legal and safe
abortions, but with the increasing number of legal restrictions on the
availability of abortion, it is no longer safe to assume that abortions are
either legal or safe.

83

Health Matrix·Volume 26·Issue 1·2016
Hobby Lobby, Birth Control, and Our Ongoing Cultural Wars:
Pleasure and Desire in the Crossfires

worth
noting,
gleaned
from
feminist
commentary
and
autobiographical sources.
First, and with or without morning
sickness, an unwanted pregnancy compromises a woman’s bodily
integrity. Her body is no longer the border between herself and the
outside world, she has become in effect permeable.37 Second, and as a
number of philosophers have argued in the different context of
abortion rights—and somewhat analogously to the effect of a military
draft on men’s bodies—an unwanted pregnancy undermines a
woman’s self-sovereignty. It reorients the purpose of her body, both
in her own perception, and that of others: her body is no longer a
vehicle for the sustenance and nurturance of the woman’s self. Her
body becomes the vehicle for the sustenance, nurturance, and
facilitation of somebody else.38 Third, as a number of legal scholars as
well as philosophers have argued, an unwanted pregnancy robs the
pregnant woman of some measure of autonomy – it limits her freedom
of movement and her range of choices and options, sometimes quite
severely, which, again, is obviously a harm.39 Lastly, an unwanted
pregnancy is quite literally alienating, in a traditionally Marxist or
labor-oriented sense: her future labor (including both the labor of the
birth itself and her future maternity) as well as her present body must
be dedicated, not to her own ends, but to the health of the fetus and
then the well-being of the child.40 The relatively unstudied psychic
(and political) harms of unwanted pregnancy, then, entirely aside
from the familiar litany of financial and physical costs, are at least
fourfold: an unwanted pregnancy compromises a woman’s physical
integrity and her self sovereignty, and it limits her autonomy and her
destiny in ways which ought to be easily recognized, at least by legal
and labor scholars, as peculiarly but profoundly alienating.

37.

This point is emphasized in the “Voices Brief” filed in Brief of SeventySeven Organizations Committed to Women’s Equality as Amici Curiae
in Support of Appellees at 2-3, Webster v. Reproductive Health
Services, 492 U.S. 490 (1989) (No. 66-605) 1989 EL 1127689, at *1-2
[hereinafter “Voices Brief”].

38.

This is portrayed vividly in Judith Thompson’s famous metaphor for an
unwanted and nonconsensual pregnancy, of a woman being forcible tied
to a born person, who will perish without the woman’s relinquishment of
the use of her body for the purpose of his sustenance. See Judith Jarvis
Thompson, A Defense of Abortion, 1 J. PHIL. & PUB. AFF. 47, 57 (1971).

39.

Voices Brief, supra note 37; Andrew Koppelman, Originalism, Abortion,
and the Thirteenth Amendment, 112 COLUM. L. REV. 1917, 1936 (2012).

40.

This is the focus of the justly famous article by Andrew Koppelman on
unwanted pregnancy as slavery, see Koppelman, supra note 39. See also
Jed Rubenfeld, The Right of Privacy, 102 HARV. L. REV. 737, 739-40
(1989).
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Why has this prong of the natural lawyers’ brief—that marital
sex that leads to unwanted pregnancies is an unalloyed intrinsic,
human, natural, good—not attracted a more vigorous response from
the neo-natural lawyers’ contemporary critics?
One reason may
simply be because of a widespread belief that today the argument
lacks practical significance: the natural lawyers have just flat-out lost
this argument, critics might think, in the court of public opinion,
which is really the only court that matters, or so we are told.
Catholic women, after all, use birth control in the same large numbers
as non-Catholic women and do so in open defiance of the Catholic
leadership’s counsel. Women with unwanted pregnancies, both in and
outside of marriage, and again both Catholic and non-Catholic, also
terminate those unwanted pregnancies that occur in spite of the use of
birth control through abortions in large numbers. The availability of
abortion and the widespread use of birth control may render the
harms occasioned by unwanted pregnancies seemingly trivial, and
therefore marginal – something that perhaps once was a problem but
simply is no longer.
There may, though, be less obvious reasons for the reticence of
the natural lawyers’ modern critics to address these harms, entirely
aside from the belief, which I think is misguided, that the argument is
just too discredited to matter. First, many would-be critics on all
sides of this debate, I suspect, tend to regard pregnancies that result
from sex in which the parties knowingly fail to use birth control, and
thus knowingly assume the risk of the unwanted pregnancy that may
result, as an “intentional” or at least quasi-intentional pregnancy: the
pregnancy is the result of an act in which parties engaged, knowingly
accepting the risk of its probably consequences. This seems clearly
true, for example, of women in traditional marriages who are morally
opposed to the use of artificial birth control and try, but fail, to
control their fertility solely through rhythm methods: if such a woman
becomes pregnant, the critic might reason, she’s laid her bed so now
she must lie in it. Her problems, or injuries, are not of concern, from
a liberal perspective. The same might be thought of women, whether
married or not, who don’t wish to become pregnant, and know full
well how birth control works, and certainly have no moral objection
to it, but carelessly or recklessly fail to use it. Both groups of women
in some sense have knowingly assumed a risk of pregnancy. For both
groups, the unwanted pregnancy that results can fairly be regarded as
“consensual.”41 And, for a host of reasons I’ve discussed elsewhere,42
41.

For an argument that they are better understood as nonconsensual, see
MCDONAGH, supra note 33, at 60-64.

42.

See generally Robin West, Authority Autonomy and Choice: The Role of
Consent in the Moral and Political Visions of Franz Kafka and Richard
Posner, 99 HARV. L. REV. 384 (1985); Robin West, Submission, Choice,
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we may be inclined to assume that all such consensual albeit
unwanted pregnancies—pregnancies in which the risk of conception
was consciously assumed—like all consensual acts, can’t really cause
harm to those who intended them, anymore than the purchaser of a
lottery ticket can be said to have been harmed by his payment of the
purchase price, when the lottery ticket turns out not to be a winner.43
To assume otherwise would be unduly paternalistic: the woman had
herself assessed the risk of the pregnancy and had the sex anyway, so
she must have herself calculated that the risk of the pregnancy times
the cost was simply outweighed by the value of the sex that might
cause it. Who are we to second-guess her? If so, then while the
unwanted pregnancy may impose a cost, it can hardly be said to
impose a harm: it is a cost for which she was fully compensated by
the pleasure of the sex that brought it about. Thus, the harms of
unwanted pregnancies simply disappear behind the veil of the
apparently consensual assumption of their risk.
More generally, though, we may fail to see that intentional and
fully consensual acts can impose harms because we don’t fully
understand that we often intend to bring about states of affairs we
don’t ourselves want, and we all may particularly fail to see this—
even semi-consciously refuse to see this—with respect to women’s
intentional use of their bodies.
As a consequence, we may fully
understand that truly unintentional pregnancies—such as pregnancies
where birth control is used but fails, or pregnancies that follow a rape,
or pregnancies that occur where birth control is unavailable, or where
the parties suffer a profound ignorance regarding its necessity—
impose cognizable harms. What we may not well understand, by
contrast, is that consensual (or intentional) but nevertheless unwanted
pregnancies, where the risk of an unwanted pregnancy is at least
dimly but nevertheless consciously assumed, either in or outside
marriage, and whether that risk is consciously assumed either because
of duty, or because of moral objections to birth control, or by virtue
of pressure from a partner, or from peer pressure, also carry with
them grave harms. One reason we might not see this is that we have
yet to understand that such a category might exist, in which we
sometimes intend to bring about states of affairs that might harm us.
And, I think we may have a particular blind spot when faced with
and Ethics: A Rejoinder to Judge Posner, 99 HARV. L. REV. 1449
(1986); West, Sex, Law, and Consent, supra note 28.
43.

The example is taken from Richard A. Posner, The Ethical and Political
Basis of the Efficiency Norm in Common Law Adjudication, 8 HOFSTRA
L. REV. 487, 492 (1980), and is criticized in Robin West, Authority
Autonomy and Choice: The Role of Consent in the Moral and Political
Visions of Franz Kafka and Richard Posner, 99 HARV. L. REV. 384, 405
(1985).
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the possibility that women may do this frequently, and may do so, in
fact, very frequently with respect to our bodies: “our bodies” that,
fifty years after that the publication of that book with that hopeful
and buoyant title, we still don’t quite see as “our selves.”
Why might that be the case? Least charitably, the psychic or
emotional harms occasioned by intentional but unwanted pregnancies
may elude notice simply because the use of women’s bodies for
reproductive or sexual ends that are disjoined from women’s own
desires strikes us all, and not just natural lawyers, as an acceptable
distribution of societal resources, or as central to a laudable
understanding of femininity, or both, at least so long as the pregnancy
can somehow be characterized as at least nominally intentional. A
woman who sacrifices her own interests, career, pleasures, self
sovereignty, autonomy, and integrity for a pregnancy she does not
want is, after all, simply engaging in a distinctive form of altruism–an
altruism that might well be distinctively unchosen (even if the risk of
it was consensually assumed) and hence distinctively illiberal, as well
as distinctively female.44 A woman who bears an unwanted but
consensual pregnancy has not decided to share her body with that of
another and then taken actions that will allow her to do so, as we
might at the end of the year decide to share our income with others in
need, and then write the checks that enable us to do so. She has,
rather, assumed a risk that something she does not want—a
pregnancy—might follow from an act she may engage in—sex. The
result—the pregnancy—forces her into an altruistic sharing of her
body’s resources. Again, women who do this routinely and as a
matter of self-identity or self-definition, are thus engaging in a form of
altruism that is both distinctively female and distinctively illiberal.
That is just not a coincidental pairing. The identification of female
(rather than male) altruism with unchosen and sometimes forced
sharing, rather than with chosen giving, is a deep one. For a very
long period in human history, in fact, that distinctive mode of
ethics—forced altruism, particularly forced altruism regarding the
body’s resources—has been a large part of what has defined not just
femininity, but also, and more specifically, the deep incompatibility of
femininity with liberal ways of being in the world.
And, that forced sharing—that feminine, unchosen, physical
altruism—is right at the heart of the natural lawyers’ conception of
femininity, of family, and ultimately of their opposition to birth
control. Thus, female sacrifice (up to and definitely including the
sacrifice of life itself) is explicitly and emphatically praised in the 1930
44.

See, e.g., Larry Blum et al., Altruism and Women’s Oppression, in
Women and Philosophy 222, 224-30 (Carol Gould & Marx Wartofsy
eds., 1976).
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encyclical–a woman who passively sacrifices her health and perhaps
her life for the sake of an unwanted pregnancy is to be much admired,
but certainly not pitied—she will, after all, receive her reward for her
sacrifice in heaven—while the woman who willfully seeks to avoid a
pregnancy or end one because of health or life is to be condemned as
having committed a grave sin.45 Continuing through to today, this
particular form of forced altruism, again explicitly for the natural
lawyers but likely in some form implicitly for many of the rest of us
as well, is simply part of what it means to be a wife. A wife just is
someone who engages in physical altruism, and who does so by virtue
of status rather than consent. But whether or not that’s a matter of
common understanding, this understanding of what it means to be a
“wife” is quite explicit in the encyclicals,46 and it might be implicit in
the neo-natural lawyers’ failure to recognize the harms of unwanted
pregnancy as harms at all, and thus to temper or condition their
valorization of marital sex. The same set of assumptions, however,
might also haunt, and limit, the critical literature on the neo natural
lawyers’ conception of heterosexual morality.
Whatever the reason for it, though, the lack of attention of both
the natural lawyers and their critics to the harms caused by all of
those unwanted pregnancies that are themselves caused by marital
sex—meaning, again, procreative, uncontracepted sex of the marital
form—is unfortunate. As we move into a world in which some women
but not others have access to birth control, greater understanding of
its point and knowledge of its effectiveness, and greater choice among
its forms, we will thereby be moving into a world not only of unequal
sexual freedom, but also of unequal control of fertility. In such a
world, more women will have unwanted pregnancies, whether
intended or not. And, perhaps it needs saying although it shouldn’t,
most of those women who will bear those unwanted pregnancies will
be poor.47 This is a harm with which we should reckon.
To sum this up: as is now fairly widely acknowledged, marriage is
not a necessary condition for the morality of any and all pregnancies
that may result from sex.
This part of the natural lawyer’s
conception of sex has been widely criticized, and our law, our politics,
and our legal attitudes all reflect that rejection. We no longer
stigmatize illegitimacy, or sequester our pregnant and unmarried
daughters, or emblazon scarlet letters on unmarried pregnant women’s
dresses or foreheads.
We celebrate the in vitro or surrogacy
45.

See 1930 Encyclical at ¶ 58, 64.

46.

See, e.g., 1930 Encyclical at ¶ 26-29, 72-75.

47.

See Fact Sheet: Unintended Pregnancies in the United States,
GUTTMACHER INST. (Feb. 2015) (noting that unintended pregnancy
rates are highest among poor and low-income women).
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pregnancies sought and treasured by our straight and gay friends,
partners, and ourselves. What has not been so widely criticized,
because it is so rarely discussed, is the natural lawyer’s valorizing
claim that marriage is also a sufficient condition, not only for the
morality of the unwanted sex that takes place within it, but also for
the unwanted pregnancies that are its natural and completely
foreseeable result.
But this claim too is wrong and even clearly
wrong. It is surely wrong to valorize nonconsensual sex—meaning
rape—within marriage, and I will argue below that it is wrong as well
to valorize unwanted sex, both marital and non-marital. But it is
also wrong to valorize the marital sex, whether wanted or unwanted,
that may lead to unwanted pregnancies. Whether inside or outside
marriage, a wanted pregnancy is more joyous, less harmful, less costly
and more emotionally and spiritually uplifting than an unwanted
pregnancy. The ideal conditions for a pregnancy are straightforward
enough and widely understood: a pregnancy should be supported by
loving parents-to-be, the pregnant woman should be in good health,
there should be ample and planned provision for the child’s nutrition,
housing and schooling, and there should be substantial time in both
parents’ lives to devote to the work of child-raising. But as a moral
minimum, a pregnancy, like sex, should be wanted. It should be
desired. It should be celebrated by the woman herself and welcomed
by her partner. The natural lawyers’ celebration of the morality of
all marital sex, including the marital sex that causes unwanted
pregnancies, fails to recognize this moral minimum.

III. The Sexual-Libertarian Brief for Birth Control
The libertarian brief for the use and dispensation of birth control,
like the natural lawyers’ argument against it, also rests on a
particular conception of heterosexual morality. All sex, according to
the sexual libertarian, including all heterosexual sex, is an intrinsic
human good, and a good to which all individuals are entitled, so long
as the sexual transactions that facilitate it are fully consensual acts,
and are therefore conducive to, as well as a product of, individual
autonomy. The formal parallelism of this conception with the natural
lawyer’s conception is striking. The sexual libertarian, like the
natural lawyer, believes that sex is intrinsically good so long as it is
(x), but while for the natural lawyer, that (x) is marriage, for the
sexual libertarian, that (x)–the condition for the morality of sex–is
consent, or, broadly, autonomy. For the natural lawyer, sex must be
of the reproductive form—and therefore marital—to be moral, and for
the sexual libertarian, sex must be consensual—and therefore
conducive to autonomy—to be moral. And, as was true of the
natural lawyer’s, the libertarian’s conception of sexual morality quite
cleanly breaks down into both a censorial and a valorizing claim, and
again, as was true of the natural lawyer’s, both the censorial and the
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valorizing claim are foundational to their argument regarding the use
of birth control.
The sexual libertarian’s censorial claim is this: Sex that is not
consensual is immoral, because it interferes with human autonomy,
just as is nonmarital sex, to the natural lawyer, including
contracepted sex within marriage, because of its interference with the
fusion of body and spirit necessary to the actualization of the moral
good of marriage. Again it’s worth noting the parallelism: for the
natural lawyer, sex that is not marital is therefore immoral, for the
libertarian, sex that is not consensual is what we should condemn.
The sexual libertarian’s valorizing claim is just this: Sex that is
consensual is not only not immoral, it is an intrinsic human good.48
Consensual or autonomous sex (hereinafter, “autonomous sex,”)
should then be celebrated, not just permitted, and in all its forms and
varieties.
Its moral value is not dependent upon any further
conditions. It clearly doesn’t have to be procreative, either in form or
fact; it doesn’t have to be open to the blossoming of a new life; it
doesn’t, therefore, have to be non-contracepted. It doesn’t have to be
heterosexual, missionary, penile-vaginal or penetrative.
It doesn’t
have to be reproductive, marital, or emotive. It doesn’t have to have
any particular form, or motive, or end. It doesn’t have to be within a
committed long-term relationship, or any relationship, and it certainly
doesn’t have to be within marriage. It can also be, although it
doesn’t have to be, instrumental toward some end other than the
pleasurable or reproductive consequence of the sex itself: it can be
enjoyed or traded for money, for security, for friendship, or for love,
no less than for pleasure.
Sex is not, though, simply a commodity, the trade of which is
conducive to wealth. Rather, within the libertarian conception,
autonomous sex is also a source of meaning, of expression, and of
individual identity.49 It is a part of the inalienable liberty to which
we are entitled as a matter of birthright. In short, we have a human
right to it, and at least post-Eisenstadt and all the more emphatically
since Lawrence, we seem to have a constitutional right to it as well.50
48.

See generally DAVID RICHARDS, SEX, DRUGS, DEATH AND THE LAW: AN
ESSAY ON HUMAN RIGHTS AND OVERCRIMINALIZATION (1986).

49.

Id. at 41 (“Such activity is clearly a natural expression of human sexual
competences and sensitivities… To deny the acceptability of such acts is
itself a human evil, a denial of the distinctive human capacities for
loving and sensual experience without ulterior procreative motives-in a
plausible sense, itself unnatural”); GARROW, supra note 4. But see
Thomas C. Grey, Do We Have an Unwritten Constitution?, 27 STAN. L.
REV. 703 (1975).

50.

See
Randy
E.
Barnett, Justice
Kennedy’s
Libertarian
Revolution: Lawrence v. Texas, 2002-2003 CATO SUP. CT. REV. 21, 2141. For a critical reading of the sexual libertarianism explicit in
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So long as it is consensual, sex, according to the valorizing prong of
the liberal conception, whether or not it is hetero, missionary, or
vaginal-penetrative in form, and whether or not it is for pay, for
pleasure, for reproduction, or otherwise, is a great human good.
Consensual sex is of positive human value, at least to the participants
and possibly to the rest of us as well.
How do these claims jointly ground the libertarian brief for birth
control? The right to use birth control, free of the constraining and
condemning arm of the state—the right essentially created in
Griswold and Eisenstadt—follows directly from a combination of
traditionally liberal or Millian arguments regarding the moral limits
on state power over acts that impose no harms on third persons, with
the content—and limits—of the sexual libertarian’s censorial claim.
Heterosexual sex is wrong, according to the sexual libertarian, if it is
nonconsensual, but only if it is nonconsensual: if it is nonconsensual,
it is assaultive, and like all assaults by definition imposes harms.51
Therefore, consensual (and therefore non-assaultive) but nonprocreative and hence contracepted sex, no less than consensual and
therefore non-assaultive but procreative sex, or sex for pleasure, or sex
for love, or sex for companionship, or sex for money, is just not in the
category of the kinds or forms of sex, or any other kinds of victimless
acts, which we should censor or condemn. The use of birth control is
not an affirmative moral wrong. There’s no sensible moral argument
against its use. Eisenstadt, of course, constitutionalized a part of this
claim, albeit obliquely.52 If constitutional privacy protects anything
at all, it should protect the use of birth control: it is a paradigmatic
instance of self-regarding behavior that is both central to identity and
inflicts no harms on others.
The argument for the accessibility and dispensation of birth
control, however—rather than just for its decriminalization—
obviously doesn’t follow from the libertarian’s censorial claim alone;
that the use of contraception is not a moral wrong, and should not be
a legal wrong, might imply that we should not criminalize it and
should perhaps constitutionalize a right to it, but it obviously doesn’t
Lawrence, see Marc Spindelman, Surviving Lawrence v. Texas, 102
MICH. L. REV. 1615, 1629 (2004) for a discussion of how the Court
vindicates sexual liberty by recognizing heterosexuals’ sexual rights and
extending that liberty to lesbians and gay men, sometimes to the
detriment of safety.
51.

For a general discussion, see West, Sex, Law, and Consent, supra note
28, at 222.

52.

For an argument that although this was how the decision was widely
read, that this was likely not what the Court intended, see Thomas C.
Grey, Eros, Civilization and the Burger Court, 43 LAW & CONTEMP.
PROBS. 83, 88-89 (1980).
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follow that birth control is such a good thing that it should be made
broadly available. The argument for the dispensation of birth control
(rather than just its legality), however, does follow, and quite directly,
from the libertarian’s valorizing claim regarding the high positive
value of autonomous sex. Because autonomous sex is an intrinsic
human good, anything that liberates autonomous sex is of value, and
anything that confines it, is a cost. Pregnancy and the fear of
pregnancy obviously greatly inhibit heterosexual sex and sexual
expression. Birth control frees us from those fears and consequences,
and thus frees heterosexual women and men both for the autonomous
sex, sexual expression and sexual pleasure to which we are all
entitled.53 Birth control, in short, is facilitative of sexual liberty.54
Therefore, birth control is not only not a wrong, but it is of great
instrumental utility—it facilitates the enjoyment of a basic human
good.55 If so, then we seemingly have not only a constitutional right to
its use, but at least a moral right as well to its dispensation.
Over the last half-century, the sexual libertarian’s valorizing
claim regarding autonomous sex—by which I mean their embrace of
autonomous sexuality as an intrinsic human good—has either
implicitly or explicitly informed a number of pro-sex, liberalizing legal
reforms, beginning with, but then moving well beyond the birth
control movement itself.56 It has, most recently, been at the heart
(although not always explicitly so) of the various legal and political
movements that have challenged moralistic censure of gay and lesbian
sex: if consensual sex is an intrinsic good, then consensual gay sex is

53.

Thus, David Richards argued in the aftermath of Eisenstadt that birth
control is of such high value in large part because it frees women to
enjoy sex, without fear of pregnancy, and perhaps for the first time in
history. DAVID A.J. RICHARDS, TOLERATION AND THE CONSTITUTION 259
(1986).

54.

GARROW, supra note 4.

55.

David Richard makes this argument directly, albeit briefly, in David
A.J. Richards, TOLERATION AND THE CONSTITUTION 259-60 (1986).

56.

David Richards for example discusses birth control, and its instrumental
value for the enjoyment of autonomous sex, only very briefly, in DAVID
A.J. RICHARDS, TOLERATION AND THE CONSTITUTION 259 (1986). He
doesn’t even mention much less discuss or take seriously the possibly
deleterious effects of that argument. Other sexual libertarians give it
shorter treatments or none at all. David Garrow’s legal history of birth
control, tellingly titled SEXUALITY AND LIBERTY, is a meticulous history
of the sexual libertarian case for birth control. Again, he does not
provide any discussion at all of the claim’s limitations, nor does he
discuss the critical views of others, other than those of conservative
sexual moralists opposed to birth control.
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as well.57 It has likewise motivated and informed the liberal feminist
campaign58 against the various antipornography ordinances that were
drafted by radical feminists in the nineteen eighties, and that were
aimed at providing women a private cause of action against
pornographers.59 If the sex depicted in pornography is consensual on
all sides, according to liberal feminist anti-censorship theorists and
activists, then not only does it do no harm, but it is also serves (and
is) an intrinsic good: sexual expression, like sex itself, is conducive to
full and rich lives for women as well as for men, unlike the censorial
impulse that seeks to repress it, and pornography, so long as it is
consensual, facilitates that expression.60 The same commitment has
likewise been at the core of a number of self-labelled “pro-sexfeminist” legal arguments of the eighties and nineties, including
critiques of the “hostile environment” prong of sexual harassment
law61 and of perceived excesses in the reach of feminist reforms of rape
law, both of which, according to pro-sex feminists, endanger the free
expression of sexuality.62 Likewise, it is the foundation for queer
theorists’ internal challenges to the liberal campaign for same sex
marriage: that campaign is obviously committed to a domesticated
and assimilated form of gay sexuality that willingly embraces
explicitly conservative constraints on sexual expression outside of
marriage.63 At the more extreme margin, the valorizing claim has
been at the center of queer critiques of the safe sex campaigns

57.

David A. J. Richards, WOMEN, GAYS, AND THE CONSTITUTION 245-52
(1998); RICHARDS, supra note 48, at 270-71; Feldblum, supra note 14;
Macedo, supra note 14, at 282.

58.

See Nan D. Hunter & Sylvia A. Law, Brief Amici Curiae of Feminist
Anti-Censorship Taskforce, Et Al., in American Booksellers Association
v. Hudnut, 21 U. MICH. J.L. REFORM 69, 69 (1987).

59.

See generally CATHARINE A. MACKINNON, ONLY WORDS (1993);
CATHARINE A. MACKINNON, TOWARD A FEMINIST THEORY OF THE STATE
(1989).

60.

See Hunter & Law, supra note 58, at 70, 121; Robin West, The
Feminist-Conservative Anti-Pornography Alliance and the 1986
Attorney General’s Commission on Pornography Report, 12 AM. B.
FOUND. RES. J. 681, 682-684 (1987).

61.

Vicki Schultz, Reconceptualizing Sexual Harassment, 107 YALE L.J. 1683
(1998); KATHERINE M. FRANKE, What’s Wrong with Sexual
Harassment?, 49 STAN. L. REV. 691, 711 (1997).

62.

Jed Rubenfeld, Rape-by-Deception—A
ONLINE 389, 392 (2013).

63.

MICHAEL WARNER, THE TROUBLE
1999).
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encouraging the use of condoms among gay men.64 Again, the logic of
all of these pro-sex movements rests on the valorizing prong of the
liberal conception of sex: Autonomous sex is an intrinsic human
good. Consent may or may not be a necessary condition for moral
sex; on that, sexual libertarians and queer theorists sometimes split.65
But it is clearly a sufficient condition for the morality of sexual acts.
On that, they all agree. Autonomous sex is very, very good, including
autonomous heterosexual sex. And, because it is so good, birth
control, which liberates it, is of high instrumental value. Autonomous
sex is a human good, and therefore contracepted heterosexual sex is
likewise, simply because birth control provides the means by which
heterosexual sex can be all the more unconstrained.
Now, unlike the censorial claim, neither the libertarian
valorization of autonomous, non-procreative heterosexual sex nor the
argument for the utility of birth control that it implies has been
subjected to much criticism, or even much discussion, within
liberalism itself; in fact, there’s virtually none. The parallel with the
neo-natural lawyer’s conception of heterosexual morality is striking:
just as the harms caused by marital sex have been unnoticed or unreckoned by neo-natural lawyers, so the harms caused by autonomous
heterosexuality have largely been unnoticed or unreckoned by sexual
libertarians. Liberals, sexual libertarians, queer theorists, and pro-sex
feminists have argued instead, and incessantly, over the meaning and
limits and implications for law of the libertarian’s censorial claim:
what “counts” as consent, what might be the markers of non-consent,
and whether non-consent is or isn’t sufficient to render sex criminal.
Does yes mean yes, and does no mean no?66 What is and what should
be the consequence of mistakenly interpreting a “no” as a “yes”?
Does deceit, like force, sufficiently vitiate consent so as to render the
sex to which it may lead a crime?67 They have looked minutely, to
borrow Alan Wertheimer’s phrase, at the “morally transformative”
function of consent in the criminal law and in positive morality both:
the way in which consent, and the permission it conveys, transforms
what would otherwise be immoral and possibly illegal assaultive

64.

For discussion, see generally Marc Spindelman, Sexual Freedom’s
Shadows, 23 YALE J.L. & FEMINISM 179, 181 (2011).

65.

See, e.g., Sarah Beresford, The Age of Consent and the Ending of Queer
Theory, LAWS 760, 763-70 (2014).

66.

Jed Rubenfeld, Mishandling Rape, THE NEW YORK TIMES SUNDAY
REVIEW (Nov. 15, 2014), http://www.nytimes.com/2014/11/16/opinion/
sunday/mishandling-rape.html?_r=0.

67.

Rubenfeld, supra note 62, at 396.
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behavior into something that is at least permitted.68 They have
examined, criticized, torn apart, dissected, deconstructed and
reconstructed the censorial claim, in other words, near obsessively.69
Given the elaborate care with which sexual libertarians have
examined the censorial claim, it is all the more striking that they
haven’t looked nearly so closely, and almost never critically, at the
sex they valorize. And because of that, they have not looked at the
harms that might be intensified by their particular argument for the
instrumental utility of birth control. What does the liberal’s blanket
approval of autonomous, non-procreative heterosexual sex
(hereinafter, autonomous sex), in all its guises, cover? What harms
does it legitimate? The next section attempts a broad outline of what
those harms might be, and concludes with suggestions of how to
minimize them, including an examination and reconstruction of the
libertarian’s brief for birth control.

IV. Is Autonomous Sex an Intrinsic Good? One
Critique
Heterosexual sex that is unambiguously consensual—in short,
“autonomous sex”—may nevertheless be harmful. A few of those
harms are recognized, and much discussed, by liberals and
conservatives both: autonomous sex can, after all, cause both sexually
transmitted disease and, if birth control fails or is misused, unhealthy
as well as unwanted and unwise pregnancies. Because of both, it can
sometimes have quite disastrous consequences; it can alter the course
of a life, or end one.
Liberals and libertarians who valorize
autonomous sex of course realize this, and that realization grounds
their argument for the instrumental utility of birth control. Because
unhealthy, unwise, and unwanted pregnancies can result from
autonomous sex, birth control has great instrumental utility: it is, in
68.

ALAN WERTHEIMER, CONSENT TO SEXUAL RELATIONS 1-2 (2003); Alan
Wertheimer, Consent and Sexual Relations, in PHILOSOPHY OF SEX:
CONTEMPORARY READINGS 341, 342 (Alan Soble ed., 2002).

69.

And well beyond, in my own view, any reasonable need to do so. Yes,
all sex should be consensual. No, it doesn’t follow from that, that all
non-consensual sex should be criminal, or criminalized to the same
degree. Non-consensual sex that is obtained through deceit that vitiates
consent should not be criminal, and for the most part it isn’t. And of
course there should be degrees of criminality for the nonconsensual sex
that is and should be criminal: some forms of nonconsensual sex are
more harmful than other forms of nonconsensual sex.
And yes,
autonomous sex includes sadomasochistic sex that paradoxically has all
the trappings of nonconsensuality—handcuffs, whips, chains and so on.
Consensually enacted rape isn’t rape anymore than its slavery. There’s
room for disagreement here, but perhaps less than contestants imagine.
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effect, a material condition for the autonomous heterosexual sex that
they valorize. Contraception, then, is not just “not wrong.” It is
materially necessary for the realization of a natural human good:
autonomous sex that is free of both reproductive consequences and
free of the worry and fear of those consequences. Such sex is a
positive good, and birth control is necessary to enjoy it. Sexual
libertarians are not, in short, blind to the harms of harmful
pregnancies, quite the contrary. Those harms are central to their
brief for the instrumental value of birth control.
But, are there nevertheless harms attendant to autonomous sex,
to which they are inattentive? I believe there are, and that they are
almost never even acknowledged or named, much less addressed,
within liberal and libertarian discourses on sex and sexual morality.
There are two, and they echo the harms risked by marital sex. First,
autonomous sex may be unwanted even if it is not rape, just as might
marital sex. And second, autonomous sex might lead to unwanted
pregnancy, either because of the failure of birth control, a decision not
to use it for moral or financial reasons, or a failure to use it correctly
because of recklessness or ignorance. I’ll take up these two harms in
that order.
First, autonomous sex, like marital sex, might be unwanted, and
when it is, it might be harmful. A girl or woman may consent to sex
with her boyfriend or partner for some of the same reasons a wife may
consent to unwanted sex with her husband: she may consent to
unwanted sex because she doesn’t want to lose him or his affection, or
because she doesn’t want to risk the fight that will ensue if she
doesn’t, or because she is afraid of his future violence if she withholds
consent, or because she wishes to keep domestic peace in her
household if they cohabitate, or to protect her children from her his
anger. A young woman or girl not involved in a long term
relationship, may also consent to heterosexual sex she doesn’t want
for other reasons as well, not so obviously or so often shared with
married women: she may consent to unwanted sex because she
wrongly believes, out of simple naïveté, that the sex is unstoppable or
“unavoidable” once her partner is aroused, or because she pities or
likes her partner, or to impress her friends, or for the approval of or
admission to a peer group, or, of course, because she thinks she needs
to do so in order to get a good grade (or a raise) she may or may not
deserve. According to a growing consensus among sex researchers,
unwanted consensual sex, no matter how motivated, is extraordinarily
common among sexually active college students of both sexes. They
differ on the likelihood of the various motivations, but seemingly
concur on the frequency of unwanted sex itself.70
70.

See supra note 27.
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In the last fifteen years, some sociologists have begun to look at
some of the harms caused by the sufferance of unwanted consensual
sex, at least among college age women, as opposed to the harms
caused by nonconsensual sex, or rape, which has been the subject of
intense and extensive study for at least fifty years. The work is in its
infancy, but it is growing. And, according to those studies, young,
college-age women who engage in unwanted but consensual sex
disproportionately suffer from depression and related psychological
and emotional harms, they are less likely to use or insist upon birth
control, so more likely to also suffer unwanted pregnancies, they have
reduced self-esteem and sexual agency. These harms, furthermore, are
likely to be long-lasting, they don’t continue only for the duration of
the sex itself, or the sexual relationship.71
Are there other harms incident to consensual but unwanted sex? I
have speculated elsewhere that all of that unwanted consensual sex
carry at least four distinctly psychic and even political harms,72 at
least obliquely evidenced in one quite extraordinary unpublished
qualitative study of unwanted sex by a Marxist-feminist scholar,73
and, much more explicitly, in some feminist memoirs.74 First, like the
woman who carries an unwanted pregnancy, a woman or a girl’s
physical integrity and her sense of herself as having physical integrity,
is invaded when she opens herself up, physically and literally, to
penile penetrative sex she does not want and does not find
pleasurable. Her body becomes, to that degree, fluid, or porous: she
views her own body as boundariless in ways that are inconsistent with
the conception of the boundaried body so central to liberal theory.75
Second, and again like the woman who bears an unwanted pregnancy,
a woman or girl who consents to unwanted sex compromises her selfsovereignty: she willfully subjugates her body and her will to someone
else’s. She acts in ways inconsistent with her own desire, and not in
71.

See Melanie J. Zimmer-Gembeck et al., Young Women’s Satisfaction
With Sex and Romance, and Emotional Reactions to Sex: Associations
With Sexual Entitlement, Efficacy, and Situational Factors, 3 EMERGING
ADULTHOOD 113 (2015); Zoe D. Peterson & Charlene L. Muehlenhard,
Conceptualizing the “Wantedness” of Women’s Consensual and
Nonconsensual Sexual Experiences: Implications for How Women Label
Their Experiences With Rape, 44 J. SEX RESEARCH 72 (2007).

72.

West, Sex, Law and Consent, supra note 28, at 5; Susan F. Appleton,
Toward a Culturally Cliterate Family Law, 23 BERKELEY J. GENDER L.
& JUST. 267 (2008).

73.

Alyson Spurgus, Embodied Invisible Labor and Sexual Carework
(unpublished manuscript) (on file with author).

74.

See generally ANDREA DWORKIN, INTERCOURSE (1988).

75.

This is graphically and powerfully presented in Andrea Dworkin’s
masterful work Intercourse, id.
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furtherance of her own pleasure. Again, the “self” she creates through
these choices is in sharp contrast to the willing, choosing, and
preferring “self” assumed by but also partly constructed by liberalism,
who relentlessly chooses based on preferences that in turn track the
subject’s own, rather than another’s, pleasures and pains.
Her
autonomy is likewise stunted, when she subordinates her own ends to
those of another, and her self possession is threatened, when she
applies her body to the work of providing a vehicle for someone else’s
pleasure. And lastly, her own moral integrity is undermined, if she
lies to her partner and herself about her own pleasures or reasons for
consenting to the sex she doesn’t want.
Physical integrity,
autonomy, self-sovereignty, self-possession and integrity are all central
components of the liberal, political self. When women and girls
willfully relinquish them in their sexual lives, they are in effect
relinquishing their entitlement to the enjoyment as well as the
challenges of that widely lauded as well as widely expected—and
intensely political—way of being in the social world.
These harms to selfhood could and should be characterized as at
least potentially political, and not just psychic or emotional.
A
woman who routinely engages in unpleasant, unpleasurable, unwanted
and unwelcome sexual intercourse, even if consensual, and whether or
not marital, might come to regard herself, and others may regard her
likewise, as being in effect the “kind of person” who has no physical
integrity, and who might of course have pleasures and pains but
whose pleasures and pains are irrelevant or marginal to her body’s
actions, and who may have and act on her own choices, but whose
choices do not reflect her own desires, and who obviously has a body,
but one which exists for the purpose of another’s sexual fulfillment.
As this becomes normalized and routinized, she may become that
much less of a “liberal subject”: a person who is prepared and
presumed to interact in a world in which a subject’s consent to
actions, trades, bargains and institutions track the subject’s
preferences and her desires. She consents to all this sex, but that
consent—her consent—does not, at least in a very important
dimension of her life, track her own preferences and desires, rather
than her partner’s. This is a distinctive and quite different political
harm than the harm done to a woman who has been raped: the
woman who consents to unwanted sex is acting and experiencing
herself as acting in a way that is contrary to the unity that we
assume in the liberal self – a unity of desire and preference and
choice, or act. The political harm of consensual unwanted sex, then,
if this is right, is that the woman or girl’s capacity to live as a “liberal
self” is badly undercut. Quite plausibly, although again there’s no
research on this, at least that I can find, that might in turn limit both
her viability and her potency in a liberal world hardly designed to
accommodate someone so constituted. Consequently, she becomes an
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illiberal subject in a liberal world. It may not be quite so surprising
that such illiberal women in liberal societies have a greater tendency
toward self-abnegation, self denial, sacrifice and altruism than their
more atomistic husbands, brothers, fathers and sons. It may not be
so surprising, even, that they don’t raise their hands in law school
classes very often and that they aren’t very adept at bargaining for a
decent price when buying a used car.76 All of that unwanted sex to
which they consent might be part of the problem, and for that reason
alone, if no other, it should count as a harm. Again, the libertarian’s
valorization of autonomous sex is seemingly blind to it.
And finally, the libertarian’s blanket celebration of autonomous
and non-procreative sex covers not only harmful unwanted sex, but it
also covers the autonomous sex, whether wanted or not, that leads to
unwanted pregnancies: those pregnancies that occur when birth
control fails, or—what is far more frequent—pregnancies that occur
when it is not used because of oversight, ignorance, unavailability, or
because of a moral belief in its wrongfulness. Unwanted pregnancies
themselves, as argued above and as widely acknowledged, are clearly
harmful in some recognized and objective ways: An unwanted
pregnancy that may result from autonomous sex, no less than an
unwanted pregnancy that may result from marital sex, may be carried
to term, if the woman is opposed to or cannot afford an abortion or
cannot access one, or it may be aborted, but either way, the
pregnancy carries with it severe financial and health risks. Shari
Motro has persuasively argued that these costs should be shared
between the partners, whether they are cohabitating or casual.77 As
with marital unwanted pregnancies, though, unwanted pregnancies
caused by autonomous sex also carry the less recognized or at least
less theorized psychic and political harms discussed above: an
unwanted pregnancy, unlike a wanted pregnancy, is an unwelcome
intrusion into and upon a woman’s body by the life and needs of
another human being, with attendant, and unwelcome, limits on her
mobility, challenges to her health, and truncation of her selfpossession, autonomy and self-sovereignty. Her body exists, against
her desires, for the interests of another, and her will follows suit.
Sexual libertarians obviously recognize at least some of the harms
occasioned by unwanted pregnancies. Indeed, recognition of those
harms is central to both the libertarian’s argument for the right to
use birth control and their argument for its dispensation: pregnancy
76.
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and the fear of pregnancy inhibit autonomous sex, autonomous sex is
a natural good, and birth control is therefore of great instrumental
value. But what sexual libertarians have not done is argue that the
morality of autonomous sex, because of the pregnancy to which it
may lead, is, precisely because of that risk, not unconditional.
Nowhere, in libertarian, liberal or feminist arguments for either birth
control or for legal abortion, is there even a suggestion that in the
absence of reliable birth control, parties simply should not have sex.
Nowhere in that voluminous literature is there a suggestion that
uncontracepted autonomous sex, even if fully consensual, is harmful,
and therefore both unwise and immoral, if the parties do not want to
conceive. Nowhere is there a suggestion that by virtue of having sex
when they are knowingly risking an unwanted pregnancy, they have
therefore done something which is immoral or wrongful. Weirdly, all
these unwanted pregnancies are immaculate conceptions: maybe they
are harmful, but if they are, the sex is not to blame, rather, the law
is.
By contrast, the harm of the unwanted pregnancy itself—as
opposed to the harmfulness of the autonomous sex that causes it—is
not at all invisible to the liberal imagination. Two prominent liberal
legal scholars—Jed Rubenfeld from Yale Law School and Andrew
Koppelman, from Northwestern—have argued over the last fifteen
years that the harm of unwanted pregnancy is so profound as to be
akin to the harms of slavery.78 Along with Eileen McDonagh’s
important work From Choice to Consent79 from the 1990s, and Judith
Thompson’s early 1970s philosophical defense of abortion,80 the
Rubenfeld-Koppelman analogy captures better than most, the severity
and the profundity of the harms occasioned by unwelcome or
unwanted pregnancies.81 Nevertheless, what both Rubenfeld and
Koppelman infer from their analogy of pregnancy to slavery, is not
the wrongfulness of the autonomous sex that risks occasioning this
crippling, enslaving harm. Rather, what both men infer from the
harms they recognize in an unwanted pregnancy is the wrongfulness
not of the sex that risks it, but of laws that would criminalize
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abortion.82 The sex itself, for both theorists, gets off scot free. This is
logically peculiar if nothing else. Surely the sex itself, and the
decision to engage in it, and not just anti-abortion laws, is at least
complicit in causing all those unwanted pregnancies, and the misery
they in turn entail.
So, why? If unwanted pregnancy is wrong, and so wrong to be
tantamount to slavery, then why isn’t the heterosexual sex that
causes it at least sometimes, and at least partly, to blame? Neither
Koppelman nor Rubenfeld provide much by way of argument for their
refusal to hold sex accountable.
They do both suggest, though,
albeit for the most part in footnotes and only very briefly, that to
“blame the sex”—to suggest that the sex, and the assumption of the
risk of pregnancy the decision to have sex entails—rather than the
laws that criminalize abortion for the imposition of unwanted
pregnancy (which, again, for both theorists, is tantamount to slavery)
would be to wrongly suggest, or imply, that sex should be foregone
where it would risk pregnancy.83 To blame the sex, rather than laws
against abortion, for the unwanted pregnancy which sex occasions,
would be in effect, to counsel for sexual abstinence. And that, they
both say, is unrealistic, undesirable, or both.84 Sex is, first, just too
good to be foresworn: to go through life without sex, Koppelman
argues in a footnote, is simply unimaginable (although it isn’t clear
why he jumps to the life-long part).85 Aside from its goodness, though,
it is unrealistic to suggest that sex that might lead to an unwanted
pregnancy should be foresworn: sex is inevitable. Sex is the result of
forces–not the dark forces of Freudian imaginings, but forces
nevertheless. They are quite literally impossible to control. Sex is
unstoppable. There’s no point in blaming the sex. The sex is going
to happen regardless.
By virtue of this insistence, both theorists unwittingly underscore
radical feminist skepticism about the motivation behind liberal
arguments for abortion and birth control generally: that the
availability of abortion is attractive to liberal men mostly because it
frees women’s bodies for male sexual use. Both theorists also give
support to the beliefs of far too many teenage girls that they may as
well consent to sex with an aroused partner even if they don’t want it
82.
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because the sex is inevitable in any event. The best that the state can
do, if we take the teenage girls’ beliefs on this score to be true, is to
handle the fallout, which we can do by making abortions safe, legal
and available. If we want to do something about the undesirability of
the unwanted pregnancies that are the fully predictable consequence
of sex that is inevitable (whether or not desired), the thing to do is to
legalize, and then constitutionalize, the right to abortion. The rather
different idea that we should respond to the specter of unwanted
pregnancy by imposing upon the parties who want to have sex but
who don’t want to conceive a duty to either use contraception
responsibly or not have sex would unfairly, or unrealistically, or both,
limit the sexual franchise. With abortion made safe, legal and
available, there is apparently no reason to further condition the
morality of heterosexual sex, even if the consequence of all that sex
for some women, in the absence of a right to an abortion, is a lived
condition that is tantamount to slavery.
So, finally, why are the harms of autonomous sex—both the
harms of unwanted sex itself and the harms of autonomous sex,
whether wanted or not, that leads to unwanted pregnancies—so
invisible within the libertarian conception of heterosexual morality? I
think there is a host of reasons. First, and as I’ve argued briefly
above, the very idea of “consensual harms,” in some economically
grounded versions of liberalism, is virtually oxymoronic: consent is
widely regarded within economic liberal theory as the mechanism by
which value is created, with the unfortunate consequence that
consensuality is viewed as in effect precluding the visibility of harms
that may be caused by any consensual transaction.86 Consensuality is
also central to some non-economic libertarian as well as liberal
feminist understandings of autonomy: consent itself is a sort of
intrinsic as well as instrumental good.
Sex, however, is also
distinctively and peculiarly valorized within contemporary liberalism
across the board, and so autonomous sex is all the more so:
autonomous sex combines the value of consensuality with the value of
sex. Sex, in the “liberal imagination,” to borrow the expression from
Stephen Macedo and Bradley and George’s exchange,87 and as Tom
Grey argued some time ago,88 is decidedly not the product of “dark
86.
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forces,” the repression of which makes civilization itself possible.
Rather, sex, quintessentially, in the modern liberal imagination,
contra Freud, is expressive, private, universal, a matter of taste,
generative of pleasure, and imposes no or few costs on others. Sexual
moralisms that assume to the contrary have imposed irrational and
profound harms on vast swaths of the community, and for no sensible
reason–as modern or contemporary liberals from Bertrand Russell89 to
H.L.A. Hart90 to Michel Foucault91 to David Richards92 and to
So long as
Stephen Macedo93 have all in different ways argued.
consensual, there simply are no further conditions for the morality of
autonomous sexuality. Therefore, the idea that sex also ought to be
mutually desired as well as mutually consensual—not only in the
workplace but everywhere—just doesn’t enter the picture. Consent is
moral condition enough. The harm, then, of unwanted but consensual
sex is invisible, or at best made grey, to the sexual libertarian, no less
than is the harm of unwanted marital sex to the natural lawyer.
The libertarian brief for birth control, and particularly its
valorizing claim, is thus a mixed blessing. Obviously, birth control
itself brings down the overall number of unwanted pregnancies from
what it would be in a world in which the valorizing claim regarding
sex had taken hold but without the technologies of reliable birth
control. What’s not so clear is whether it brings that overall number
down below what it would be in a world in which the technologies are
available and the valorizing claim had not taken hold. But whatever
one might think of any of that, birth control itself surely doesn’t bring
89.
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down the overall number to the degree it would, were its use argued
as a duty, and not just a right, by its most ardent defenders. And,
obviously, birth control itself doesn’t ameliorate at all the harms of
the unwanted sex that the sexual libertarian’s conception of sexual
morality valorizes. Particularly when combined with the ideological
and dogmatically valorizing conception of the value of autonomous
sex that has fueled its availability, birth control might in fact worsen
those harms.
The libertarian brief for birth control, no less than the natural
lawyer’s brief against it, is premised on a conception of heterosexual
morality that runs roughshod over women’s desires and women’s
pleasures both: the natural law conception does so by valorizing
marital sex and the unwanted pregnancies it causes, and the
libertarian’s does so by valorizing autonomous sex, whether or not
unwanted, and whether or not pleasurable, and by refusing to
condition the morality of even wanted and pleasurable autonomous
sex on the responsible use of birth control. Both natural lawyers and
libertarians, in brief, valorize either pregnancies, or sex, or both,
regardless of women’s desire or lack of desire.
Does this matter? The harms caused by unwanted but either
marital or autonomous sex, as well as unwanted but intentional
pregnancy, whether marital or not, cannot in any obvious way ground
lawsuits or crimes. Nevertheless, those harms, including the psychic
and political harms occasioned by both unwanted sex and unwanted
pregnancy, should be acknowledged and minimized. Instead, they are
multiplying. And, they are intensified by one or the other of two
conceptions of heterosexual morality to which almost all of us have
more or less signed on, at least in the legal academy. The conclusion
that follows comments briefly on how we might ameliorate the
damage we’ve wrought.

Conclusion
Neither marriage nor the “marital form” of the sex that occurs
within it guarantees that sex is mutually desired. But consent doesn’t
guarantee mutual desire either, no matter how consent is defined. In
fact, one cost of the campaign for “affirmative consent” in our current
conversations about rape is simply that it obscures this fact: the
problem many women, and particularly young women, face with
respect to sexuality is not that a man understands her passive
acquiescence to sex as a yes while she understands it as a no, but
rather, that she say “yes” so frequently—both passively and
actively—to sex that she does not truly desire and does not want and
from which she will take no pleasure.
That problem is hardly
clarified, and in fact it is obscured—and badly—by “yes means yes”
campaigns. Likewise, though, abstinence-only campaigns, pushed
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aggressively (whether or not successfully) by moral conservatives as
the best way to deal with social problems attendant to sex outside of
marriage, don’t in any way guarantee that the sex inside traditional
marriages of the approved and celebrated reproductive form is also
wanted. In fact, they obfuscate that problem, and for exactly the
same reason: that a woman abstains from premarital sex doesn’t mean
that she wants particular sexual acts that occur within her marriage.
The same is true of women’s desires, pleasures, and interests with
respect to pregnancy: pregnancies that result from either autonomous
or marital sex can be unwanted, and when they are, they are harmful.
Yet, women’s sexual and reproductive desires, women’s sexual and
reproductive pleasures, and to a stunning degree, women’s sexual and
reproductive interests are simply irrelevant to the two conceptions of
the morality of heterosexual sex that continue to define the poles of
our cultural-sexual debates around birth control.
There is now little doubt that marriage does indeed make us
happier, richer, healthier, and more long-lived, and it makes our
children’s lives happier, richer, healthier and more long-lived as well,
as the institution of marriage’s defenders and celebrants have long
insisted.94 Social conservatives have largely won the argument for the
social utility of marriage. There is also now little doubt that the
liberal’s censorial claim regarding the necessity of consent to moral
sex is a major advance for liberalism and women both.
Nonconsensual sex is indeed always wrong (whether or not it is also
always rape), and it is wrong whether or not the victim was a sex
worker, whether or not she actively resisted, whether or not there was
force employed, whether or not the parties were on a date, and
whether or not they were married. Liberals have won that argument,
and we’re all—but particularly women—the better off for it.
Nevertheless, neither consent nor marriage is sufficient to guarantee
that sex is truly moral, no matter how consensual or how marital the
sex.
All sex, as well all the pregnancies all that sex sometimes
causes, should be mutually wanted. When it is not mutually desired,
it is harmful, and when both parties know that it is not desired by
one or the other of them, it is immoral. A woman’s desire is a
necessary condition for the morality of the sex in which she engages,
as well as for the morality of the pregnancy and maternity that may
result. Neither marriage nor consent suffices.
The harms caused by deeply entrenched beliefs to the contrary
should be addressed. The natural lawyer’s conception of heterosexual
morality—the blanket valorization of all uncontracepted penetrative
sex within marriage—also implicitly valorizes unwanted sex and quite
94.
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explicitly valorizes the unwanted pregnancies that such sex (whether
wanted or unwanted) may cause. To the extent that women live
their sexual married lives on the basis of that belief, all of that
uncontracepted marital sex presumably causes quite a few unwanted
pregnancies. The libertarian’s conception of heterosexual morality –
the blanket valorization of all autonomous heterosexual sex within or
outside of marriage and the instrumental value attached to birth
control accordingly –also valorizes unwanted autonomous sex as well.
To the extent that women live their sexual lives on the basis of that
liberal belief, all of that autonomous sex, when unwanted, carries
unreckoned harms in its wake. Taking these harms seriously would
require taking women’s desires seriously as a moral condition of sex
and reproduction both, whether inside marriage, with respect to the
natural law conception, or outside of it, as per the liberal. That
might be hard to do, in part, for the straightforwardly sexist reason
that it is women more often than not who bear the brunt of those
harms. To counter them requires us to reverse the course of
millennia, and center rather than marginalize not just harms borne
peculiarly by women, but also women’s desires, including, most
concretely, women’s lack of desire, when they lack it, for heterosexual
penetrative sex and for pregnancy both.
It shouldn’t be so hard to do, though, either within a socially
conservative milieu that honors the dignity and the sanctity of both
women’s and men’s bodies, or in a liberal regime that honors their
free will. The natural lawyer’s insistence on the intrinsic moral value
of heterosexual sex of the reproductive form could easily be amended
to accommodate this simple moral fact: whatever one might think of
the necessity of the reproductive form to moral sex and to the
pregnancies that result, marriage and whatever “marital form” for sex
one might wish to specify are clearly not sufficient conditions for the
morality of marital sex. Mutual desire is a necessary condition of the
morality of marital sex and of the pregnancies to which that sex
sometimes leads. A woman’s or a man’s lack of desire for either sex
or a pregnancy should be accorded moral veto power over the couple’s
decision to have sex, so as to minimize unwanted sex and unwanted
pregnancy both. Even in a traditional relationship in which the use
of birth control is off the table on moral grounds, the recognition of
such a constraint would go some ways toward reducing both the
amount of unwanted sex and the number of unwanted pregnancies
within traditional marriages. A woman in an otherwise completely
traditional marriage who only has sex when she affirmatively desires
it, and who, during the periods in which she believes herself to be
fertile, only when and if she also actively desires a pregnancy (rather
than when she is open to a risk), will have less unwanted sex and
fewer unwanted pregnancies simply by acting on those desires, and by
insisting her partner does likewise.
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Just as clearly, the libertarian’s valorization of autonomous sex
stands in need of amendment: mutual desire, not just consensuality, is
a necessary moral condition of both sex and the pregnancies that can
result. Libertarians are surely correct to believe that the morality of
consensual sex does not depend upon the marital status, or the
gender, or the sexual orientation, much less the race or class of the
parties engaging in it.
But it does depend on mutual desire. A
woman or girl who has consensual sex only when she feels a desire for
it will have less unwanted sex and suffer fewer of its attendant harms
than a woman or girl who does not do so. Likewise, a woman or girl
who feels herself and her partner to be under a moral duty to use
contraception when she wants the sex but not the pregnancy that
may result, and has uncontracepted sex only when she affirmatively
desires a pregnancy, will suffer far fewer unwanted pregnancies. Those
are the behaviors we should be actively encouraging, both for our
children and for ourselves: you don’t just have a right to birth control
under the Constitution, or a right to its availability under the ACA.
You also have a moral duty to use it, or to abstain from sex if you do
not want to become pregnant.
And whether or not you’re using
birth control, you have a moral duty to your present and future self
not to have sex when you don’t want to, and not to impose it on an
unwanting, even if consenting, partner. Finally, ought does indeed
imply can: sex in point of fact is not inevitable, even when hotly
desired. With that straightforward change in consciousness–that
amendment to our liberal embrace of the positive value of
autonomous sex—we’d all be better off.
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